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OHIO’S TARGETED COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVE
TO PRISON PROGRAM: HOW A GOOD IDEA IS
IMPLEMENTED THROUGH BAD POLICY
SAMANTHA SOHL*
ABSTRACT
Just because a legislature can make a law, doesn’t mean that they should. The Ohio
General Assembly enacted the Targeted Community Alternatives to Prison program
to decrease the number of convicted defendants sent to state prison and to increase
funding for community control efforts. While the law may be upheld under the Ohio
Constitution’s Uniformity Clause, the law should still be repealed because legislative
control and financial influence have no place in the judicial branch, specifically the
criminal sentencing process. However, the law is rooted in good intentions, and many
judges have found the additional funding useful, but the conditions on that funding
should be repealed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Should the geographical location of a crime be the sole distinguishing factor
between two identical individuals sentenced for the same exact crime? Should other
branches be capable of exerting influence over the judicial branch, either at the state
or federal level? Should a judge’s decision on how to sentence an individual carry a
monetary influence?
Imagine that an individual lives in Cuyahoga County in Northeast Ohio, and is
found guilty of breaking and entering—a felony of the fifth degree.1 Now imagine that
this defendant has reached the sentencing phase of the process, and because he has no
criminal history, the presiding judge is unable to sentence him to prison, without the
loss of a substantial sum of the County’s money. 2 Instead, the judge must sentence
him to community control sanctions, such as probation, parole, or another community
treatment facility, or risk losing much needed grant money for his county. 3
Now, imagine that same individual lives in Lake County—another Northeast Ohio
county—and is found guilty of breaking and entering. He has, again, reached the
sentencing phase of the trial process. He still has no criminal history, but the presiding
judge has the discretion to, and ultimately decides, to sentence our defendant to sixmonths in jail.4 Alternatively, imagine that this judge sentences him to the same
community control sanctions as in our previous scenario. Even though the outcomes
might seem to be the same on the surface, these judges may have arrived at their
decisions following different paths of thought. In our Cuyahoga County scenario, the
judge’s decision may have been motivated by the county’s grant money—money that
he knows his county needs to establish and maintain more community control
sanctions programs. He likely had to balance this factor with the severity of the
defendant’s crime, as well as his own gut feeling as to what best constitutes justice for
this offender. On the other hand, the judge in Lake County did not have such
considerations weighing on him. His choice was entirely his own, guided by the law
as expressed in the Ohio Revised Code.
The Ohio Targeted Community Alternatives to Prison (“T-CAP”) program,
established in House Bill 49, went into effect on July 1, 2018.5 There were ten “target”
counties in which this program mandated the above sentencing guideline. 6 The other
seventy-eight Ohio counties participating in the program are doing so on a completely

* Samantha Sohl - J.D. expected, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, May 2019. I would like
to thank my professors who guided me during the research and writing of this Note. I would
also like to thank my fellow editors on the Cleveland State Law Review for all their diligence
and hard work in the editing and review process.
1

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.13 (West 2019).

2

See H.B. 49, 132d Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2017).

3

See id.

4

See id.

5

See generally id.

6 Id. (including Franklin, Cuyahoga, Hamilton, Summit, Montgomery, Lucas, Butler,
Stark, Lorain, and Mahoning).
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voluntary basis, that is, if they choose to do so at all.7 Prior to this legislation,
defendants convicted of felonies of the fifth degree were subject to prison terms of
six-to-twelve months, and offenders convicted of felonies of the fourth degree were
subject to prison terms of six-to-eighteen months.8 These offenders were also subject
to a simple fine or community control sanctions, in place of prison time. The Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) states that the purpose of this
legislation is to ensure that offenders receive the treatment that they need while
reducing the overpopulation of Ohio’s prisons by diverting certain offenders that it
deems are less dangerous or in less need of severe punishment, from prison to
community control programs. 9
Prior to T-CAP taking effect, there was a concern that it would not have a uniform
application throughout the state, and may be in violation of the Ohio Constitution. 10
For laws to be valid under the Ohio Constitution, they must be applied in a uniform
fashion pursuant to Article II, Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution. 11 The Uniformity
Clause also adds another qualification: only laws of a general nature are required to
have a uniform application.12 The Ohio Constitution does not define either term, so it
is up to the Ohio Supreme Court to do so. While there has been extensive case law
regarding laws of a general nature, the Ohio Supreme Court has not reached the issue
of whether sentencing laws like T-CAP are of a general nature.
In addition to the constitutionality concern, there is a major policy concern at the
forefront of this challenge. The judicial branch, whether it be at the state or federal
level, should be free from external influence, which includes the indirect monetary
influence T-CAP inadvertently exudes. This concern arises in the target counties that
lose grant money when judges do not follow T-CAP’s sentencing guidelines. While
additional funding is always desirable, especially in criminal justice reform, making it
dependent on a judge’s actions and decisions removes the independence from the
judicial branch, thereby allowing constituents to influence judicial decisions.
This Note argues that the T-CAP program, as currently applied to the ten target
counties and other voluntary counties, is constitutional, even though it technically
violates the Uniformity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.13 Ohio’s T-CAP program is
a law of a general nature, because sentencing is a subject that affects people of all
counties. Furthermore, sentencing is an area of common interest for the citizens of
7

Id.

OHIO CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, Felony Sentencing Quick Reference Guide 9 (May
2017),
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/Sentencing/resources/judPractitioner/felonyQuick
Ref.pdf. In addition to the overcrowding of Ohio’s prisons, there is also an issue of a lack of
available treatment and a high rate of recidivism, which is not discussed in this Note.
8

9 Targeted Community Alternatives to Prison (T-CAP), OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR.,
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/tcap (last visited February 13, 2018) [hereinafter ODRC].

Alan Johnson, O’Brien Asks Kasich to Veto Prison Diversion in State Budget, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (June 30, 2017), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20170630/obrien-asks-kasich-toveto-prison-diversion-in-state-budget.
10

11

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26.

12

Id.

13

Id. (“All laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation through the State.”).
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each county. The program, through its statutory application to the ten target counties,
may not seem to be uniformly applied, but the voluntary county provision and the
ODRC’s intention to eventually apply this to all Ohio counties will have a substantial
effect on the outcome of potential litigation relating to this issue. Because the
legislation that establishes the T-CAP program states that all counties may participate,
one could argue that it is uniformly applied. This Note will argue that T-CAP is
constitutional even through it is not uniform, as evidenced by the mandatory
application in the ten target counties. Even though T-CAP is constitutional, this Note
argues that the Ohio General Assembly should still repeal the law as it creates external
influence on judges at the county level in Ohio.
Part II of this Note will give a background of the Uniformity Clause of the Ohio
Constitution and establish a definition for laws of a general nature. It will also discuss
the history of T-CAP, similar programs established by the Ohio General Assembly,
and the establishment and organization of Ohio’s judicial branch. Part III will analyze
Ohio case law to extract a definition of laws of a general nature and will apply T-CAP
to the definition to determine whether it meets the definition. Part III will also discuss
whether T-CAP is applied uniformly, in compliance with the Ohio Constitution, and
will determine whether the voluntary provision in T-CAP calls for a uniform
application of the law. Additionally, this Note will analyze whether, regardless TCAP’s constitutionality under the Uniformity Clause, such an external economic
influence on the judicial branch is the best way to effect change. Part IV concludes
that the T-CAP program does not violate the Ohio Constitution Uniformity Clause,
and that the voluntary provision satisfies the requirement of uniformity. Further, this
Note will conclude that the judicial branch should be independent and that T-CAP,
while its intentions and motivations are commendable, should not be applied in its
current form.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The State of the Law in Ohio Before House Bill 49 and T-CAP
In 1979, the Ohio became the sixth state to adopt a community corrections act. 14
These acts established programs and funding to establish local community control
sanctions to divert felony offenders from state prison. 15 Ohio used this as an
opportunity to create community based correctional facilities and prison subsidy
programs. In 1990, this act was amended to include jail diversion programs, which
represented a partnership between the state and local governments in creating a
network of community control sanctions. 16 Services in these programs include basic

Christopher T. Lowenkamp, et al., Evaluation of Ohio’s CCA Funded Programs
Executive
Summary,
UNIV.
OF
CINCINNATI
2
(April
28,
2005),
https://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/reports/project_reports/CCA_Executive_Summ
ary.pdf.
14

15

Id.

Id.; see also Bureau of Community Sanctions, OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR.,
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/community (“Programs funded by the Bureau [of Community
Sanctions] include Halfway Houses, Community-Based Correctional Facilities, Community
Residential Centers, Permanent Supportive Housing, and Community Corrections Act grant
programs including Intensive Supervision Probation, Standard Probation, Prosecutorial
Diversion, Non-Supervisory Treatment Programs, Electronic Monitoring, and Community
16
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probation, supervision, intensive probation supervision, pretrial services, day reports,
electronic monitory and house arrest, work release, domestic violence programs, and
community service.17 These programs originally created community based
correctional facilities, prison subsidy programs, as well as halfway houses and nonresidential community correction programs. 18
The Ohio Community Corrections Act jail and prison diversion programs are
funded by the ODRC, just as with T-CAP.19 In 2002, over 160 subsidy programs in
seventy-nine counties received funding through grants for the diversion programs
under the Community Corrections Act.20 Multiple studies have been done to verify the
effect that the Community Corrections Act programs have had on the recidivism rates
of offenders, but it was recommended that the ODRC “develop policy and procedure
to guide the placement of offenders” into the programs, and that such policies should
put emphasis on the higher risk offenders. 21
In 2012, the Ohio General Assembly passed Senate Bill 160 which allowed judges
to directly sentence certain felony offenders to prison on a first offense for specific
crimes, including crimes involving firearms, physical harm, bond violations, or sexual
offenses.22 Since 2013, judges in Ohio have been permitted to sentence first-time
offenders in those categories to terms in prison if certain conditions are met. 23 Prior to
Senate Bill 160, Senate Bill 86 was passed in September 2010, which limited the
ability of judges to send many first-time felons to prison for committing fourth and
fifth degree felonies.24 This became controversial, especially in cases where certain
sexual offenders were no longer eligible for prison. 25 While Ohio, like other states,
has a history of influencing judicial action through legislation, T-CAP is in a league
of its own, specifically in how it influences the judicial branch. 26
B. Enactment of T-CAP
The Ohio General Assembly passed House Bill 49 in 2017, thereby establishing
T-CAP.27 In relevant part, this law states that:
Work Service.”). It is important to note that these programs have been and continue to be funded
by grant money outside of the T-CAP legislation.
17

Lowenkamp, supra note 14, at 3.

18

Id.

19

See Bureau of Community Sanctions, supra note 16.

20

Lowenkamp, supra note 14, at 2.

21

Id. at 4.

22

S.B. 129, 131st Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2013).

23

Lowenkamp, supra note 14, at 4.

24 Jenna Gant, New Felony Sentencing Guidelines Take Effect, CT. NEWS OHIO (April 1,
2013),
http://www.courtnewsohio.gov/happening/2013/sentencingGuidelines_040113.asp#.XEIKE89
KgWo.
25

Id.

26

See generally id.

27

H.B. 49, 132d Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2017).
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[N]o person sentenced by the court of common pleas of a target county or
of a voluntary county to a prison term that is twelve months or less for a
felony of the fifth degree shall serve the term in an institution under the
control of the department of rehabilitation and correction. The person shall
instead serve the sentence as a term of confinement in a facility in division
(C) or (D) of this section.28
Section (C) goes on to state that:
A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to one or more misdemeanors
and who is sentenced to a jail term of imprisonment pursuant to the
conviction or convictions shall serve that term in a county, multicounty,
municipal, municipal-county, or multicounty-municipal jail or workhouse;
in a community alternative sentencing center or district community
alternative sentencing center . . . or if the misdemeanor or misdemeanors
are not offenses of violence, in a minimum security jail.29
Section (D) establishes that “[n]othing in this section prohibits the commitment,
referral, or sentencing of a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony to a
community-based correctional facility.” 30
With the passage of the bill, T-CAP is now mandatory for ten target counties,
namely Franklin, Cuyahoga, Hamilton, Summit, Montgomery, Lucas, Butler, Stark,
Lorain, and Mahoning counties, and is voluntary for Ohio’s seventy-eight other
counties.31 T-CAP will give grants to participating counties to supplement the
community corrections funds that to establish new programs that seek to address the
needs of Ohio’s prison program, its citizens, while also looking to reduce the state
prison population.32
As incentive for enforcement, T-CAP provides grants to supplement community
correction funds.33 However, T-CAP also penalizes participating counties with a
deduction from the grant issued per prisoner that the participating county sentences to
prison that would otherwise be eligible for a diversion program. 34 While this does not
technically qualify as a penalty provision—because the county cannot lose what it
never had—it is a significant concern that T-CAP presents the power to potentially
manipulate judges to sentence offenders, against their better judgment, because they
fear their political reputation and the risk of losing grant dollars.
T-CAP seeks to reduce the prison population by diverting level-five felonye
offenders, who meet specific criteria, from state prison to local community sanction

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

ODRC, supra note 9.

33

Targeting Community Alternatives to Prison by Helping Ohio Communities Manage
Low-Level, Non-Violent Offenders, OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., http://www.ccao.org/wpcontent/uploads/TCAP%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited February 3, 2019).
34

See ODRC, supra note 9.
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programs.35 Fifth degree felonies are the lowest felony level recognized by Ohio law. 36
Counties can also elect to apply T-CAP to certain fourth degree felony offenses. 37
Ohio defines the prison term for fifth degree felony offenders as ranging from six-totwelve months, and six-to-eighteen months for fourth degree felonies.38 These
offenses typically include crimes relating to drug possession and certain theft or
assault cases.39 Additionally, violent offenders, sexual offenders, and certain drug
offenders are not eligible for diversion under T-CAP.40 Offenders of crimes with
mandatory prison terms are also not eligible. 41
The ODRC administered pilot grants that involve eight county common pleas
courts, including Clinton, Ross, Medina, Lucas, Defiance, Henry, Williams, and
Fulton counties.42 These pilot counties received T-CAP grant funding and agreed to
supervise, treat, and sanction all offenders under the program locally without the use
of a state prison sanction.43 While some courts have been receptive and have praised
T-CAP, other courts have found that having such funding predicated on judicial
decisions amounts to bribery.44

35

Ohio H.B. 49.

36

OHIO CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 8.

See ODRC, supra note 9 (“Two of the grant sites, Medina and the multi county site, also
choose to target the same Felony 4 offenses.”). Additionally, T-CAP applies to those sentenced
to a prison term of twelve months or less, which includes certain fourth degree felony offenses.
37

38

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14 (A)(4)–(5) (West 2018).

39

OHIO CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 8, at 5–6.

40

Ohio H.B. 49.

41

Id.

42

ODRC, supra note 9.

43

Id.

44 Compare TCAP Testimony: Hearing on H.B. 49 Before the Ohio Gen. Assembly, 132d
Gen. Assemb. (Mar. 31, 2017) (testimony of Judge Joyce V. Kimbler, Medina County Court of
Common Pleas), with Ed Balint, Judges: New Felony Sentencing Law Puts Stark at Risk,
CANTON REPOSITORY (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.cantonrep.com/news/ 20171003/judges-newfelony-sentencing-law-puts-stark-at-risk. Judge Kimbler is a judge in the Medina Court of
Common Pleas. Medina is one of the counties that has already received a pilot grant from the
ODRC through T-CAP. Judge Kimbler submitted her testimony to the Ohio Senate Finance
Committee to share her praise of the program. Judge Kimbler stated that with the funding from
T-CAP, Medina has been able to directly address the local heroin epidemic. Additionally, Judge
Kimbler stated that the money allowed the sheriff to re-open a previously closed jail pod to
house low-level offenders. While all of these outcomes are desirable and entirely necessary to
address the issues targeted by T-CAP, this type of funding should come without restrictions on
judges’ actions.
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C. Examples and Explanations of Ohio’s Prison Program and Alternative
Community Control Sanctions
Prison is the most restrictive sanction for offenders. 45 Counties may spend T-CAP
funding on any community correction purpose that avoids such a restriction,
including: supervision services, local incarceration (including community based
correction facility placements), electronic monitoring, substance use monitoring,
substance abuse treatment, and additional programming and resources that the county
may deem necessary.46 Supervision services include probation, which is defined as a
“court ordered period of correctional supervision in the community.” 47 In other words,
probation is a suspension of a sentence that is used as an alternate to jail or prison.
Local incarceration could be in a jail or a community based correction facility, which
is a residential sanction that provides an alternative to prison for offenders on felony
probation.48 Residential sanctions are those in which the offender is confined to a
facility, while a non-residential sanction is a lack of confinement, but the offender is
subject to the supervision of the locality, county, or state. 49 Under T-CAP, individuals
sentenced to twelve months or less in state prison can still serve their sentence in local
jails.50
D. Relevant Ohio Prison Statistics
Ohio’s prison population is counted as of January 1 each year and has steadily
increased.51 In 2007, the prison population totaled 48,482 inmates, and in 2011, the
population totaled 50,857 inmates. 52 Correctional facilities also measure the total
number of offenders within a year who are committed to prison, which at one point
was as high as 28,714 persons in 2006, and as low as 23,191 in 2010. 53
It is important to note that many of the target counties are also the counties in Ohio
that commit the most offenders to prisons.54 The counties with the highest percentage
of commitments in 2010 were Lucas, Stark, Montgomery, Summit, Franklin,
Hamilton, and Cuyahoga. 55 These seven counties totaled about the same number of
commitments as all of Ohio’s other eighty-one counties combined.56 Additionally,
45 OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, Ohio Criminal Justice Statistics 59 (2010),
http://www.publicsafety. ohio.gov/links/ ocjs_statistics.pdf.
46

ODRC, supra note 9; see also T-Cap Testimony, supra note 44 (explaining that Medina
county re-opened a local jail pod at the sheriff’s office to monitor local offenders more closely).
47

OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 45, at 54.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

See T-Cap Testimony, supra note 44.

51

OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 45, at 61.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 62.

55

Id.

56

Id.
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these seven counties often yield the highest percentage of returning criminals or
reoffenders.57
In 2010, 27.3% of all offenders committed in Ohio were offenders of felonies of
the fifth degree58 and 23.9% of offenders committed were offenders of felonies of the
fourth degree.59 In other words, over half of the prison population in Ohio was
sentenced to state prison for violating fourth or fifth degree felonies. It is also
important to note that 26% of offenders committed to state prison in Ohio committed
violent crimes against persons, while another 26% committed drug offense. 60 This
emphasis is important because certain offenses, such as those that include violence
and drugs, are not included in T-CAP’s changes to the sentencing guidelines.61
Furthermore, state prisons are funded through the state budget. 62 Ohio’s prisons
are overcrowded and underfunded, and as such, T-CAP intends to fix these problems
by incentivizing counties to stop sending lower level offenders to state prison. 63 The
ultimate goal of the program is to decrease the state budget for state prisons, but this
is done at the expense of underfunding the counties and communities in which the
offenders remain after sentencing. Additionally, if the offender is eligible for T-CAP
and the judge still sentences him or her to prison, then the county loses funds that may
already be insufficient to support the community control sanctions that T-CAP aims
to build.64
E. The Ohio Constitution and the Uniformity Clause
Article II of the Ohio Constitution vests the legislative power in the Ohio General
Assembly.65 Similar to the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution
establishes the requirements for holding office in the Ohio General Assembly, the
organization of each house, and the process for a bill to become a law. 66 The Ohio
Constitution places limits on the types of laws that the General Assembly can pass. 67
For example, Article II, Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution specifically prohibits the
General Assembly from passing legislation that has a special effect on a limited
number of counties throughout the state, stating that “[a]ll laws, of a general nature,

57

Id.

58

Id. at 64.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

See H.B. 49, 132d Gen Assemb. (Ohio 2017). Additionally, seven percent of felony
offenders committed to state prisons were guilty of sexual offenses, which are also not included
in the legislation that established T-CAP; OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 45, at 64.
62

See generally ODRC, supra note 9.

63

See id.

64

See generally id.

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General
Assembly consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
65

66

Id. §§ 2–3, 5, 7, 15, 16.

67

Id. § 26.
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shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.” 68 This section of the Ohio
Constitution intends to restrict the General Assembly from making special laws,
provides for the fair application of laws, and ensures the General Assembly employs
the necessary time, knowledge, and skill in legislating. 69
The drafters of the Ohio Constitution did not provide a definition for laws of a
general nature, so it falls on the Ohio Supreme Court to define this term. 70 As an
example of this, in 1984, Ohio placed a measure on the ballot seeking to construct free
turnpikes.71 Although this measure purportedly won by a majority vote, a challenge
ensued because the number of votes for and against the free turnpikes was less than
the number of votes cast in that county for the secretary of state.72 As such, the plaintiff
claimed that the ballot’s issue did not actually obtain a majority of votes.73
Furthermore, the plaintiff asserted that even if the ballot measure carried a majority of
the votes, the commissioner would not be able to proceed under the act because it
violated Article II, Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution. 74
Prior to Hixson, the Ohio Supreme Court established a general rule as to the scope
and enforcement of the constitutional section, but refused to “define [it] with
precision,” instead noting the complexity of establishing such a definition. 75 The court
in Hixson asked how to determine whether a given subject is of a general nature and
established a test: “[i]f the subject does or may exist in, and affect the people of, every
county in the state, it is of a general nature. On the contrary, if the subject cannot exist
in, or affect the people of, every county, it is local or special.” 76 This definition and
test has not been overruled in over a century. 77
After establishing the definition of laws of a general nature, the court asked
whether the subject of roads and highways is of a local or general nature.78 The court
concluded that if they were not of a general nature, members of the Ohio General
Assembly would lobby for their specific constituents instead of the entire state, the
population of which is utilizing the roads. 79 The court also reasoned that laws
concerning roads were enacted by the second session of the General Assembly, which

68

Id.

69

Hixson v. Burson, 43 N.E. 1000, 1002 (Ohio 1896).

70

See id. at 1001.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id. (citing Kelly v. State, 6 Ohio St. 269, 271 (Ohio 1856)).

76

Id.

77

See Brown v. State, 166 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ohio 1929); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach,
568 N.E.2d 1206, 1212 (Ohio 1991); Put-in-Bay Island Taxing Dist. Auth. v. Colonial Inc., 605
N.E.2d 21, 23 (1992).
78

Hixon, 43 N.E. at 1002.

79

Id.
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emphasizes the importance of roads in uniformity across the entire state. 80 From this,
the court concluded that the subject of roads is of a general nature, and “that it is not
only capable of being, but ought to be, legislated upon by general laws having a
uniform operation throughout the state.” 81
As with the term “laws of a general nature,” the drafters of the Ohio Constitution
did not provide a definition or test for the requirement of uniform application of all
laws. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that uniform operation means “universal
operation as to territory. It takes in the whole state.” 82 Additionally, the court held that
this term means “universal operation as to all persons and things in the same condition
or category.”83 The court concluded that, “[w]hen a law is available in every part of
the state as to all persons and things in the same condition or category, it is of uniform
operation throughout the state.”84
But, the Ohio Supreme Court did not stop there. Instead of establishing a quasiexception to the uniform application requirement—that the law does not need to have
current effect in every county to be constitutional—it held that a law need only be able
to take effect if a county meets the criteria established by the promulgated law. 85 Thus,
so long as it is possible to meet a law’s criteria, the law does not violate the Uniformity
Clause.
F. The Structure of Ohio’s Judicial Branch
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution establishes the judicial branch for the State. 86
It states that “[t]he judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of
appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions thereof, and such other courts inferior
to the Supreme Court as may from time to time be established by law.” 87 It further
provides for the organization and jurisdiction of the commons pleas courts, stating that
“[t]here shall be a court of common pleas and such divisions thereof as may be
established by law serving each county of the state.” 88
The selection, or more specifically, the election process, is set out in Article IV as
well.89 “The judges of the courts of common pleas . . . shall be elected by the electors
of the counties . . . in which their respective courts are located, for terms not less than
six years.”90 This means that in Ohio, as with other states, a voter will find judges on

80

Id. at 1001.

81

Id. at 1003.

82

State ex rel. Wirsch v. Spellmire, 65 N.E. 619, 622 (Ohio 1902).

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Kelley’s Island Caddy Shack, Inc. v. Zaino, 775 N.E.2d 489, 492 (Ohio 2002).

86

OHIO CONST. art. IV.

87

Id. § 1.

88

Id. § 4.

89

Id. § 6.

90

Id. § 5.
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their ballots in both the primary and general elections. At the time of the primary, the
judges must declare a party affiliation. 91
III. T-CAP IS NOT UNIFORMLY APPLIED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE II, SECTION 26 OF
THE OHIO CONSTITUTION
Ohio House Bill 49 lists eight target counties that must follow T-CAP.92 The
Ohio Constitution prohibits this sort of law from enforcement when such enforcement
is not uniformly applied across the entire state. 93 The statute’s voluntary provision
provides for potential enforcement throughout all counties of the entire state, but still
mandates participation of the eight named counties.94 The Ohio Supreme Court has
heard many cases regarding uniformity provision, and as such, the court has
established a test regarding the application of general laws in a uniform fashion. 95
A. Laws of a General Nature
The Ohio Constitution does not provide a definition for “law of general nature.”
In Hixson, the court held that laws are of a general nature “if the subject does or may
exist in, and affect the people of, every county, in the state” or where all citizens of
the state have a common interest.96 The court further explained that the
constitutionality of a statute is determined by both its subject matter and its operation
and effect, not alone by its form. 97 Therefore, the analysis of T-CAP under the
uniformity clause must include not only the text of the statute, but the application of
the law.
In its application, T-CAP’s subject matter affects every citizen of every county in
the State.98 This is evidenced in the introductory hypothetical of this Note. In its
operation, T-CAP does not apply to every citizen of every county in Ohio, because ten
counties are targeted, while the other seventy-eight counties can choose to elect into
T-CAP or maintain the same system they have always had.99 This calls into question
the constitutionality of this portion of House Bill 49, because in form, it is seemingly
uniformly applied, while in operation it is not.
91

Lorraine Bailey, Nonpartisan Judicial Election Law Upheld, COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(February 11, 2016), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20171020/ohios-judicial-races-arenonpartisan-in-name-only-expert-says.
92

H.B. 49, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017).

93

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26.

94 Ohio H.B. 49 (“‘Voluntary county’ means any county in which the board of county
commissioners of the county and the administrative judge of the general division of the court of
common pleas of the county enter into an agreement of the type described in division (B)(3)(b)
of this section.”).
95 See Hixson v. Burson, 43 N.E. 1000, 1002 (Ohio 1896); see also State ex rel. Wirsch v.
Spellmire, 65 N.E. 619, 622 (Ohio 1902); S. Euclid Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 80 v.
D’Amico, 468 N.E. 2d 735 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Cincinnati v. Shannon, 410 N.E. 2d 1265
(Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
96

Hixson, 43 N.E. at 1002.

97

Id. at 1001.

98

ODRC, supra note 9.

99

Id.
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Hixson provided a definition for laws of a general nature in 1896 that has not been
overruled in over 120 years. 100 The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently applied the
Hixon definition in cases addressing constitutional challenges under Article II, Section
26 of the Ohio Constitution. 101 There would be no difference when considering TCAP, and as such, the Ohio Supreme Court would find T-CAP unconstitutional under
the Uniformity Clause because it is not uniformly applied; however, the voluntary
provision and the Ohio General Assembly’s intent might impact this conclusion.
1. T-CAP Is a Law of a General Nature
To determine whether a law concerns a subject matter of a general nature, the court
must first determine the subject matter of the law. 102 House Bill 49, specifically its
sections establishing T-CAP, address the broad subject matter of sentencing criminal
offenders.103 T-CAP places restrictions on common pleas judges in specific counties
regarding what types of offenders judges can sentence to state prison, send to a
diversion program, or place under community control sanctions.104 While T-CAP
mandatorily applies to a certain number of counties, criminal sentencing occurs in
every county, thus creating safety concerns.
For example, laws prohibiting and criminalizing conduct considered a felony are
found in the Ohio Revised Code.105 The Ohio Revised Code applies to every county
in Ohio.106 Therefore, a felony offense in Cuyahoga County is considered a felony
offense in every single Ohio county. The Ohio Revised Code also contains sentencing
guidelines.107 Because these guidelines are the same for every judge, regardless of
county, it is logical to conclude that sentencing guidelines are laws of a general nature.
Furthermore, applying the definition established in Hixson, sentencing guidelines
are laws of a general nature because they exist in and affect the people in every county
in the state.108 The Ohio General Assembly enacts the laws prohibiting the behavior
covered by T-CAP. Therefore, the sentencing for the violations of these laws also
applies to every citizen in Ohio, and because T-CAP concerns sentencing regulations,
it is a law of a general nature.
The General Assembly may attempt to alter sentencing guidelines in an attempt to
appease members’ specific constituents, whether they make them more stringent,
harsher, or lesser. However, this would be bad policy, as it would prove illogical to
allow different counties to devise different punishments for state statutory offenses.
Think back to the hypothetical provided in the Introduction of this Note—two
100

See Hixson, 43 N.E. 1000.

101

See, e.g., Desenco, Inc. v. City of Akron, 706 N.E.2d 323, 330 (Ohio 1999); Middletown
v. Ferguson, 495 N.E.2d 380, 387 (Ohio 1986); State ex rel. Wirsch v. Spellmire, 65 N.E. 619,
620 (Ohio 1902).
102

Hixson, 43 N.E. at 1002.

103

H.B. 49, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017).

104

See id.

105

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.13(C) (West 2019).

106

See generally OHIO REV. CODE tit. 3.

107

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14 (West 2019).

108

Hixson v. Burson, 43 N.E. 1000, 1001 (Ohio 1896).
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identical felony offenders in neighboring counties could receive entirely different
sentences under T-CAP as applied, because Cuyahoga County is a target county, while
Lake County has not yet decided to volunteer for T-CAP. While individuals often
receive different sentences, T-CAP pushes past these bounds by mandating a
difference, particularly because it is the difference between state prison and
community control.
B. Uniform Application of Laws of a General Nature
Because the subject of sentencing is of a general nature, T-CAP is a law of a
general nature, which means it must be uniformly applied across the state to be
constitutional.109 Similar to laws of a general nature, the Ohio Constitution does not
provide a definition or explanation for the meaning of “uniform application.” In
Hixson, the court held that roads were a subject of a general nature, but the court never
reached the question of whether it was uniformly applied. 110 To be constitutional, the
General Assembly must apply T-CAP uniformly, meaning, it must have “universal
operation as to territory” and “universal operation as to all persons and things in the
same condition or category.” 111
1. T-CAP is Not Applied Uniformly
Under the Ohio Supreme Court’s definition, T-CAP is not uniformly applied.
When applying that reasoning, T-Cap may seem unconstitutional. T-CAP does not
have “universal operation” because it is not operative in all eighty-eight of Ohio’s
counties.112 It might have met this universal operation requirement if every voluntary
county elected into T-CAP, however such is not the case at this time. 113
Additionally, T-CAP does not have “universal operation as to all persons and
things in the same condition or category.”114 The program must be effective upon all
fourth and fifth-degree felony offenders that meet the criteria established in House Bill
49, but it is only effective upon those offenders in the target counties, as well as those
offenders living in counties which choose to participate.115 Because of this, T-CAP
does not have universal operation on all persons in the same category, because fourth
and fifth degree felony offenders can, and will, be sentenced differently under the law.

109

See H.B. 49, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017).

110

Hixson, 43 N.E. at 1003.

111

State ex rel. Wirsch v. Spellmire, 65 N.E. 619, 622 (Ohio 1902).

112

See Ohio H.B. 49.

113

David Wright, Highland County Nixes ODRC Program Participation, THE TIMESGAZETTE (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.timesgazette.com/news/18630/highland-county-nixesodrc-program-participation (discussing the Highland County Board of Commissioners decision
to opt out of T-CAP because they were concerned as to whether or not the program would be
beneficial to the county); Ed Balint, supra note 44 (discussing Stark County’s judges’ concerns
regarding T-CAP, specifically its potential effect on public safety and receiving insufficient
funds for the justice system to serve its purpose).
114

Wirsch, 65 N.E. at 622.

115

See ORDC, supra note 9.
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2. Uniform Application Under City of E. Liverpool v. Columbiana County Budget
Commission
Our analysis continues, however, because the Ohio Supreme Court has held that
geographic distinctions alone may not be enough for a successful constitutional
challenge under the Uniformity Clause.116 This is where the anticipated constitutional
challenge to House Bill 49 and T-CAP falls apart. In City of East Liverpool v.
Columbiana County Budget Comm’n, the City of East Liverpool challenged the
constitutionality of a piece of legislation that changed the procedure for the adoption
of an alternative method for apportioning specific funds, claiming that the law in
question violated the Uniformity Clause.117 East Liverpool challenged the law because
its share of the apportioned funds decreased, and it contended that the new procedure
violated the clause because it is “limited to ‘counties in which [the largest city] has a
population of twenty thousand or less and a population that is less than fifteen percent
of the total population of the county.’” 118
Accordingly, the City of East Liverpool claimed that the “geographic limitation
transforms [the law] into a special law on a general subject matter.” 119 The Ohio
Supreme Court held that the law did not violate the Uniformity Clause because the
constitution prohibits “arbitrary geographic distinctions, not reasonable measures that
have a geographic element or disparate geographic effect.” 120 It reasoned that a limit
based on population “represents a rational balancing of political subdivision interests”
to balance out the population concentration in big cities versus the smaller population
in smaller cities.121
In City of East Liverpool, the court specifically stated that the Uniformity Clause
prohibits “arbitrary geographic distinctions,” which means that further analysis is
necessary to determine what the court considers to be an arbitrary distinction. 122 The
Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “a law operates as an unreasonable classification
where it seeks to create artificial distinctions where no real distinction exists.”123 The
court also stated that courts should “look to the purpose underlying the statutory
classification and if the statute achieves a legitimate governmental purpose and
operates equally on all persons or entities included within its provisions, it shall be
deemed constitutional.”124 In City of East Liverpool, the Ohio Supreme Courtourt held
that the statute in question was a general law and that it operated uniformly because it
may apply to any county that meets the population requirement. 125
See City of E. Liverpool v. Columbiana Cty. Budget Comm’n, 870 N.E.2d 705, 710
(Ohio 2007).
116

117

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1213 (Ohio 1991).

124

Id. at 1214.
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City of E. Liverpool, 870 N.E.2d at 710–11.
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As it currently stands, T-CAP does not have a uniform application across the state;
however, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the argument that a geographic distinction
is a violation of the Uniformity Clause.126 The legislation that created T-CAP creates
a geographic distinction. The City of East Liverpool court found that the geographical
distinction was based on the population differences and felt that the distinction was
good law to balance out the population disparity between big and small cities. 127 One
could argue this is also the case for the application of T-CAP. The primary purpose of
T-CAP is to decrease the population and expenses of state prisons by incentivizing, or
penalizing, counties that send low-level offenders to state prison. 128 This is done by
targeting those counties that commit the most offenders to state prisons.129
Additionally, it is the intent of the Ohio General Assembly and the ODRC to put TCAP into effect in all counties as soon as it is plausible.130 Because of its purpose and
application strategy, T-CAP should fall under the quasi-exception established in City
of East Liverpool. Furthermore, T-CAP does not create “arbitrary” geographic
distinctions. Of the ten mandated counties, Lucas, Stark, Montgomery, Summit,
Franklin, Hamilton, and Cuyahoga commit the most offenders to state prisons in
Ohio.131 Because seven of the ten mandated counties contribute the highest number of
offenders in Ohio to the state prisons, it is logical for the Ohio General Assembly to
target these counties in their first attempt to apply T-CAP.
Additionally, the court “should inquire into the purpose underlying a statutory
classification where such classification causes disparate results, and if the statute
achieves a legitimate governmental purpose and operates equally on all persons or
entities included within its provisions it shall be deemed constitutional.” 132 Clearly, on
its face, T-CAP causes disparate results by separating Ohio’s counties into target and
voluntary.133 However, the analysis cannot end there, as stated by the court in
Zupancic.134 T-CAP does not operate as an unreasonable classification because there
is a very real distinction that exists between the counties, as evidenced by the targeting
of those counties that send the most offenders to state prisons. Finally, looking to the
underlying purpose of the statutory classification employed by T-CAP, it is clear that
T-CAP should fall under the quasi-exception to the uniformity requirement. The
ODRC stated that the purpose of this legislation was to ensure that offenders receive
the treatment that they need and to reduce the overpopulation of Ohio’s prisons by
diverting certain offenders, especially those deemed less dangerous or in need of less
severe punishment, from prison to community control programs. T-CAP aims to
achieve this legitimate governmental purpose while applying equally to all persons,
namely fourth and fifth degree felony offenders.
126

Id. at 710.

127

Id.

128

ODRC, supra note 9.

129

OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 45, at 62.

130

ODRC, supra note 9.
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OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 45, at 62.
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State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1207 (Ohio 1991).
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See H.B. 49, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017).
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Zupancic, 568 N.E.2d at 1213–14.
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C. The Voluntary Provision Brings T-CAP Under the Quasi-Exception to the
Uniformity Clause
The Ohio Supreme Court has carved out a quasi-exception to the Uniformity
Clause, holding that “uniformity does not require that the statute actually have current
application in every county.”135 Therefore, the voluntary provision under T-CAP may
seem to resolve the issue of whether the statute is uniformly applied, because all
counties can participate if they so choose. 136 Additionally, the ODRC and the Ohio
General Assembly have stated that T-CAP is still in a pilot stage. 137 This indicates
that, while there may not be a current application in every county, the intent is to apply
T-CAP in every county, thus exceeding the court’s test in Kelley’s Island Caddy
Shack, Inc. v. Zaino.138
In Kelley’s Island, a vendor in the village of Kelley’s Island challenged a law
enacted by the Ohio General Assembly which allowed towns or cities to declare
themselves resort areas if they met certain criteria.139 Once established as a resort area,
the town or city could levy taxes on vendors, which Kelley’s Island did. 140 The court,
in establishing the quasi-exception, found that the statute did not violate the
Uniformity Clause because “a statute is deemed to be uniform despite applying to only
one case so long as its terms are uniform and it may apply to cases similarly situated
in the future.”141
The court distinguished Kelly’s Island, from another similar case, Put-in-Bay
Island Taxing Dist. Auth. v. Colonial, Inc., which held that a tax levied on vendors
violated the Uniformity Clause with its geographic limitation, because there are a
finite number of islands in the State of Ohio.142 Kelley’s Island and Put-in-Bay
represent two similar issues that were decided very differently. The deciding factor in
these two cases was the potential for the application of the resort area designation for
the tax to take effect.143 In both cases, vendors challenged the laws because it took a
portion of their profits. The court held the law in Put-in-Bay was unconstitutional
because its limit constituted an exclusive club that no one else in Ohio could join. 144
The court in Kelley’s Island, on the other hand, reasoned that it doesn’t matter how
the law is applied, as long as it has the potential for uniform application. 145
135

Kelley’s Island Caddy Shack, Inc. v. Zaino, 775 N.E.2d 489, 492 (Ohio 2002).

136

See ODRC, supra note 9.

137

Id.
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Kelley’s Island Caddy Shack, Inc., 775 N.E.2d at 492.

139

Id. at 490.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 492.

142 See id. (citing Put-in-Bay Island Taxing Dist. Auth. v. Colonial, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 21, 23
(Ohio 1992)).
143

Kelley’s Island Caddy Shack, Inc., 775 N.E.2d at 492.

144

Put-in-Bay Island Taxing Dist. Auth. v. Colonial, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ohio 1992).
There is a finite number of islands in Ohio and barring a natural disaster or a miracle, no other
towns would be able to achieve island status.
145

Kelley’s Island Caddy Shack, Inc., 775 N.E.2d at 492.
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The question presented here is whether the voluntary provision in T-CAP satisfies
this exception-like language in Kelley’s Island, or whether it is similar to the law that
was found unconstitutional in Put-in-Bay. House Bill 49’s provision that all counties
may participate in T-CAP if they so choose answers this question in a positive manner,
because the law has the ability to take effect in every single Ohio county and every
single county has the opportunity to elect into the program if they so choose. 146 The
court in Put-in-Bay found that the required characteristic of the town being an island
was exclusive and no other towns in Ohio could join.147 That is not the case with TCAP, not only because of the voluntary participation provision, but because there are
no further distinctions other than the target and voluntary counties component.
Further, there are no limits on the participation of voluntary counties.148 T-CAP may
not have current application in every county, but such facts are essential in determining
whether T-CAP falls under the quasi-exception.
House Bill 49 contains a provision that allows other counties, outside of the eight
target counties, to participate in T-CAP.149 Under this provision, counties can choose
to join the program and receive grant money as an incentive to divert fourth and fifth
degree felony offenders, who meet the additional criteria under T-CAP, from state
prisons to community control sanctions. 150 Some argue that the counties voluntarily
participating in T-CAP see the grant program as an incentive program, not as a
penalty.151 These counties would theoretically volunteer to participate with full
knowledge of the grant money, and such will likely be a deciding factor in
participating. The counties that were mandated to participate do not receive the same
perk, however this is insignificant. This incentive program strongly resembles a
penalty program and risks making judges focus more on his or her constituents than
justice and rehabilitation.
However, further analysis is needed. The court must consider the voluntary
provision, along with the mandate to determine whether it has a uniform application
throughout the entire State of Ohio. Additionally, it must consider whether it is the
Ohio General Assembly’s intent to apply the same sentencing guidelines and distribute
similar grant money to all counties throughout Ohio, without the distinction of target
or voluntary. While the voluntary provision seemingly satisfies the court’s reasoning
in Kelley’s Island, an issue arises that presents the reverse of the Kelley’s Island
holding. Namely, instead of being able to participate in T-CAP, the mandated counties
cannot opt out of participation in T-CAP.152 There is a considerable distinction
between the ten target counties, which are subject to the mandate, and the voluntary
146

H.B. 49, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017).

147

Put-in-Bay Island Taxing Dist. Auth., 605 N.E.2d at 23.
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See Ohio H.B. 49.
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Id.
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Josh Sweigert, Sheriff’s Fear that Local Jails Will Swell from State Prison Program,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.mydaytondailynews.com/news/crime-law/going-shove-felons-down-our-throats-ohio-sheriff-says-about-new-prisonlaw/dpaChPVtFvGR1Vozqs6EvJ/.
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.34(B)(3)(a)–(b) (West 2019); see also ODRC, supra note
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counties.153 That distinction has never been contradicted. The distinction serves a
purpose, such as targeting the counties that contribute the most offenders to Ohio’s
prisons first to begin effecting real change.
IV. T-CAP IS NOT GOOD PUBLIC POLICY AND THE OHIO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SHOULD REPEAL THE LAW
It may be argued that the loss of grant money per prisoner sentenced to prison that
is eligible for diversion under T-CAP is a penalty provision. However, the penalty
provision in House Bill 49 is less of a penalty and more of an incentive for
participation for the voluntary counties, because they likely chose to participate
because of additional funding options. A problem arises when judges divert from TCAP’s required path and lose grant money given to their counties. 154 Specifically,
opponents of T-CAP are concerned that this provision, which they view as a penalty,
will exert undue influence upon judges. 155
Before it went into effect, T-CAP faced a great deal of controversy. 156 Concerns
with T-CAP have ranged from issues pertaining to judicial discretion, to concerns that
the program will underfund counties.157 For example, Highland County announced its
decision not to participate in the program, citing concerns about underfunding,
primarily that T-CAP does not provide enough funds to supplement the mandatory
changes that accompany the grants.158 This lack of funding will undermine the purpose
of the program. Smaller counties may find the funding to be adequate, especially
because many of those counties have underfunded programs and an influx of
offenders.
The uniform application of laws is also important for the social order, which was
a motivation for the drafters of the Ohio Constitution. 159 If different Ohio counties
could make rules regarding sentencing that differ from statewide laws, then safety and
order may be called into question. It is argued “that actual legal systems in reasonably
successful societies have a clear moral principle behind at least much of their law . . .
[which] includes social order.”160 Therefore, laws that do not have a clear moral
principle do not support the social order. This is evident in the drafters’ intent of the
Uniformity Clause that members of the Ohio General Assembly cannot enact
153

See OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 45, at 62.
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ODRC, supra note 9.

Bailant, supra note 113 (“A Stark County judge has compared the new grant program for
fifth-degree felonies to bribery. Another primary criticism is it strips judges of the discretion to
do their job.”).
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Thomas Suddes, Editorial, Gov. Kasich’s Stay-out-of-Prison Free Card,
CLEVELAND.COM
(May.
4,
2017),
https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/04/gov_kasichs_budget_could_mean.html.
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157 Rocky A. Coss, Opinion, Judge Coss Addresses Proposed Amendment in Ohio House
Bill 49 and Its Effect on the Local Level, HIGHLAND CTY. PRESS (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://highlandcountypress.com/Content/Opinions/Opinion/Article/Judge-Coss-addressesproposed-amendment-in-Ohio-House-Bill-49-and-its-effect-on-the-local-level/4/22/37307.
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legislation that favors their constituents over others. 161 And while the uniform
application of laws is important for the social order, the lack of per se uniform
application under T-CAP does not undermine the social order, because there is a clear
moral principle behind the law. The ODRC has stated that the purpose is to decrease
the prison population, and perhaps alone this would not stand up to such scrutiny, but
it is also to get offenders the treatment they need and lower the rate of re-offending.162
A. T-CAP’s Impact on Judicial Discretion and Independence
Concerns arise that this will make judges more susceptible to their constituents
instead of the impartial independent entity that they are supposed to represent in the
political and legal system. Historically, the judicial branch of the government is
intended to be independent of partisanship, instead upholding and interpreting the law
as it relates to the Constitution of the United States and the respective states.163 But TCAP causes judges to be more susceptible to their constituents, instead of remaining
insulated from the political atmosphere, because they rely on the public for re-election.
Additionally, Stark County declined to put the program into effect early, turning
down roughly $900,000 in funding by doing so. 164 Stark County judges reject
participation and feel that participating in T-CAP amounts to “bribery” and “strips
[them] of the discretion to do their job.”165 Safety greatly influences the decision as
well. Stark County claims that the law represents about 130 defendants, but the grant
is insufficient to cover the community treatment for these offenders. 166
In Ohio, county common pleas judges are elected by the citizens of each judge’s
respective county.167 In the primary elections, party affiliation is included on the
ballot.168 This is already one step away from judicial independence, because judges
are beholden to a political party, when in theory they are supposed to be independent
of partisanship.169 Now, it is true that in the general election, judges names appear on
the ballot without a party distinction, but this is insignificant, because to make it to the
general election, the judges must first make it past the partisan primary election. 170
T-CAP makes the judicial branch even less independent of partisan politics by
predicating much needed funding on the judges’ decisions. While the money is much
needed and some judges have found the grants to be a marvelous gift, it cannot be
ignored that the judicial branch is losing independence. It is the judge’s responsibility
to sentence an offender, and it should be left to the judge’s discretion when fashioning
161
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See Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV.
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the sentence, whether it’s a community control sanction, such as probation, or a more
restrictive sanction, such as state prison. And even though T-CAP does not take away
that sentencing responsibility, it adds even more responsibility for judges to carry in
that judges become responsible for the county gaining or losing T-CAP grant money,
and consequently gaining or losing potential votes in both the primary and general
elections.
While Ohio’s prisons are overcrowded, and county and other local level
community control programs are underfunded, conditioning this necessary grant
money on judicial decisions is unnecessary and improper. 171 The Ohio General
Assembly should still distribute this grant money on the condition that it is used to
expand community controls, because there is evidence that it works, as seen in Medina
County. Judge Joyce Kimbler, a Medina County Court of Common Pleas judge, is a
zealous advocate of T-CAP’s grants because it has finally given her the power to deal
with the overwhelming heroin epidemic, in addition to the other offenders in her
county.172 This is exactly what the ODRC and the Ohio General Assembly intended
T-CAP to do; however, they are misguided by the notion that the only way to reach
this desired outcome is by indirectly funding judicial decisions. As evidenced by Judge
Kimbler’s enthusiastic response to finally being able to do something beneficial for
her county in regard to the heroin issue, it is imperative that Ohio’s common pleas
judges divert lower level offenders if the county has the resources without the addition
of a condition placed on the funding.
T-CAP intends to decrease the prison population, because state prisons in Ohio are
over capacity.173 The purpose of the statutory classification is that the ten target
counties contribute the most fourth and fifth degree felony offenders to state
prisons.174 Furthermore, the program is in a pilot or trial stage at the moment, so it
does not mean that it will not be mandated to other counties in the future. 175 Because
of this, it is unlikely that the geographic classification, based on the state’s purported
interest, will nullify the law pursuant to the Uniformity Clause of the Ohio
Constitution. However, the geographic classification is not arbitrary and it serves the
ODRC’s purpose, and therefore, it will likely be found to be constitutional. But a
finding of constitutionality does not mean that the law is good public policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
T-CAP is a law of a general nature and, therefore, uniform application is
constitutionally required. While the law has a great motive in reducing the prison
population in Ohio, it needs to be applied across every county to be constitutional and
171 See Jackie Borchardt, Proposed Reforms Could Divert 3,400 Offenders from Ohio’s
Overcrowded Prisons. Not Everyone Is on Board., CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/04/proposed_reforms_could_divert.html.
172

TCAP Testimony, supra note 44.

173

ODRC, supra note 9.

OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 45. The seven most highly populated counties
in Ohio committed fifty-three percent of offenders to prison, which are often the counties to
which most offenders return. The counties are Lucas, Stark, Montgomery, Summit, Franklin,
Hamilton, and Cuyahoga. These are also the counties in which T-CAP will go into effect in July
1, 2018, supporting the purpose of the program.
174

175

ODRC, supra note 9.
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effective. Judges should not be monetarily incentivized to sentence offenders, because
they are supposed to be independent actors in the judicial system. Uniform application
of T-CAP would preserve judicial integrity and improve Ohio’s prison system, but
uniform application is not the best choice. Judicial discretion and independence is of
the utmost importance in an effective government, and connecting judges to financial
aid to their respective counties is bad public policy. 176 The Ohio General Assembly
should appeal House Bill 49’s establishment of T-CAP and replace it with a simple
grant program that does not condition the funding on judicial decision.
The hypothetical presented in the Introduction of this Note is a potential
consequence of the current lack of uniform application of T-CAP across Ohio. The
purpose of the law, however, is to reduce prison population, which will likely result
because it mandates participation to those counties that contribute the most offenders
to state prisons each year.177 While the purpose of the law does not supersede the Ohio
Constitution, nor its drafters’ rationale for Article II, Section 26 that laws that affect
the entire state should have the same application, T-CAP is still constitutionally valid
under the Uniformity Clause.178 The drafters did not want a lack of fairness permeating
and affecting the enforcement of such laws. 179 This is evident in the language of the
Uniformity Clause which limits the requirement of uniform application to laws of a
general nature, but does not include local ordinances or special laws that only concern
specific aspects of some counties. 180 T-CAP, even though it is not per se uniformly
applied, does not effect a lack of fairness, because the purpose of the law is best served
by targeting certain counties to start with, because the target counties contribute the
most offenders to state prisons in Ohio.181
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